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Abstract
In this paper we study how the access price affects the choice of the tariff regime
taken by the network operators. We show that for high values of the access price, that
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wise, for low values of the access charge, networks charge also the receivers. Moreover,
we compare market penetration and total welfare between the two price regimes. Our
model suggests that, for high values of call externality, market penetration and total
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1 Introduction
In order to provide interconnection among all users, telecom networks need access to rival’s
consumers. Access is provided after the payment of a termination charge (or access price).
This charge is a part of the cost of off-net calls and consequently affects the price of calls.
Last years in Europe have seen a growing discussion among regulatory authorities
about regulation of termination charges or access prices. On the one hand, the Euro-
pean Commission (2008, 2009) recommended to lower termination charges in order to
lower average price per minute. On the other hand, some of them (e.g. Ofcom, the
UK telecommunications regulator) are worried that this could bring network operators to
charge consumers for receiving a call or, in other words, to switch from a Calling Party
Pays (CPP) regime, where only callers pay for making a call, to a Receiving Party Pays
(RPP) regime, where both caller and receiver pay to join a call.
Ofcom has expressed several concerns about the introduction of a RPP tariff regime.1
The main objections of the UK telecommunications regulatory authority are that it would
be disruptive to customers, it would meet with consumer resistance and it might also lead
to customers turning off their mobile phones. There exist many works about this last
concern (e.g. Bomsel et al. (2003), Cadman (2007) and Samarajiva & Melody (2000)) but
they are not providing a theoretical background to their analysis. In particular, there is
not any model which explain how market penetration and welfare would change switching
from one regime to the other. Our intention is to model the two tariff regimes and provide
a theoretical framework to compare them.
Littlechild (2006) reports some differences between the two regimes. Some data are
summarized in Table 1.
In RPP countries minutes of usage are more than in CPP countries. To understand
the reason of that, it is important to notice that RPP countries usually adopt Bill & Keep
(BaK) as interconnection arrangement. This means that network operators pay a price
equal to zero (or close to) in order to terminate phone calls. Hence, a BaK policy reduces
the marginal costs of traffic and therefore usage prices, leading to higher usage.
In 2005 market penetration in US and Canada is far below penetration in EU but
in other BaK countries as Hong Kong penetration is above EU average. Other data of
2008 in ERG (2009)2 show that US penetration of 87% is lower than EU average of 123%.
However, penetration in Hong Kong and Singapore is above EU average. From these data
seems that market penetration is lower in BaK countries, but in CPP countries penetration
1See Oftel (2002) and Ofcom (2005).
2See ERG (2009), Next Generation Networks Future Charging Mechanisms / Long Term Termination
Issues.
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Min. of use (per months) Penetration (%, 2005)
RPP countries
USA 630 61
Canada 359 47
Hong Kong 387 106
Singapore 282 90
CPP countries
UK 151 104
Germany 76 87
France 225 74
Italy 120 110
Spain 135 99
Table 1: Mobile market structure in selected countries (2005).
might be overstated because of the traditionally greater number of prepaid schemes and
multiple SIM cards.3
In this paper we provide a theoretical analysis to show how the choice of the access
price determines the retail pricing regime: our model confirms that CPP is a choice of the
telecommunications industry in response to access prices above termination cost. Other-
wise, for access prices below cost, networks prefer to charge receivers as well. Moreover,
we compare our predictions for two regimes with actual data in order to give some indica-
tions to the regulator. It turns out that with high call externality, a BaK policy (which is
associated to RPP regimes) implies higher usage and higher market penetration. This is
because higher usage increases utility of joining a mobile network and consequently more
people would like to join a network. Moreover, BaK maximizes social welfare with respect
to any other policy.
Our model stresses the relevance of the call externality (the utility that consumers
3A report of Analysis Mason (2008, pag. 8) for Ofcom says:
While looking at the comparative statics, it is important to note that the standard penetration
data [. . . ] measures the number of subscriptions in circulation, and not the number of users
who hold mobile subscriptions, which in the case of Hong Kong, Singapore and the UK is
much lower [. . . ].
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obtain for receiving a call). Indeed, as the European Commission (2008) remarks, the
welfare-maximizer policy about the access price may be very different for different values
of the call externality. For low values our model suggests that the optimal policy is to set
the access price close to the termination cost and, consequently, to induce the industry to
adopt a CPP price regime. Otherwise, for high values of call externality, the optimal policy
should be BaK (in this case the industry would adopt a RPP regime). The reason is that
RPP regimes internalize the call externality by making the receiver paying for receiving
the call.4 Hence, when this externality is relevant, RPP regimes are more efficient.
Related literature. The main contribution to the literature on telecommunications is
given by the seminal papers by Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998a,b). In their
papers they model telecommunications competition between two network operators that
compete for consumers that obtain utility only from making calls. Laffont et al. (1998a)
analyze network interconnection in an unregulated environment where price discrimina-
tion is excluded. They show that for non-linear retail prices, high interconnection tariffs
raise final retail prices and reduce social welfare. Gans & King (2001) corrected the above
analyses and found that, under price discrimination and non-linear pricing, networks pre-
fer an access price below cost.5
These papers inspired many works. Jeon et al. (2004) extend these models and allow
consumers to obtain utility from receiving calls. In the usual setup of two horizontaly
differentiated networks with full coverage of the market, they introduce the possibility for
operators to charge customers also for receiving a call. Hence receivers may affect volume
of the calls by hanging up first. The authors derive equilibrium usage prices under different
off-net pricing tariffs. On the one hand, without network based discrimination, networks
set prices equal to the perceived marginal cost. On the other hand, in presence of network
based discrimination, networks set high off-net prices (for high values of the externality,
interconnection breaks down) and on-net prices lower than the marginal cost. To avoid
multiplicity of equilibria, they introduce a noise term in the utility of the receiver.6
Cambini & Valletti (2008) use a model where the demand of phone calls between each
pair of customers is jointly determined. They show that under certain conditions the
connectivity breakdown is eliminated. Moreover, they explain the relationship between
4For a discussion of this topic, see BEREC (2010b).
5For a good survey of the literature, see Armstrong (2002).
6Notice that the hypothesis of full coverage prevents the possibility of analyzing the effects of different
access price policy on the market size and their consequences on the welfare. Indeed, in a paragraph the
authors study incomplete coverage but they limit their analysis to the definition of the equilibrium usage
prices.
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the access charge and the structure of the retail prices chosen by the network operators
(networks choose to charge the receiver only if the access charge is sufficiently low). Lopez
(2008) extends Jeon et al. (2004) in another direction. He introduces a random variable
also in the utility of the caller. In this framework, networks set prices equal to the per-
ceived marginal cost. Moreover, he shows that firm’s profits do not depend on the access
charge.
Finally, Hermalin & Katz (2009) allow consumers to obtain utility from receiving calls but,
differently from the previous papers, they assume that networks compete on quantities. It
turns out that a regulator can not induce efficient off-net prices through the access charge.
In this paper we modify the framework described in Jeon et al. (2004) and we incorporate
market expansion in the benchmark model to compare equilibrium prices (including the
fixed part), market penetration and profits in the two different tariff regimes. Under no
network-based discrimination, we consider the case where networks charge a strictly posi-
tive charge to the receivers (Receiver Party Pays regime) and the case where networks do
not charge consumers for receiving a call (Caller Party Pays regime).
In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium prices
and quantities in the two tariff regimes. In Section 4 we simulate the equilibrium results
and we compare the solutions in the two cases. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We generalize the model introduced by Jeon et al. (2004) allowing for market expansion.
Networks. We consider two mobile networks i = 1, 2 located at two points of an infinite
Hotelling line. We normalize to one the distance between the two networks. Mobile
networks incur a fixed cost per consumer f and have on-net call cost of c = 2c0+c1, where
c0 is the marginal cost of originating or terminating a call and c1 is the marginal cost of
transmitting a call. Let a denote the access charge or termination charge. The marginal
cost of an off-net call is therefore c + (a − c0) for the caller’s network and c0 − a for the
receiver’s network.
Tariffs. Mobile network i offers a multi-part tariff (pi, ri, Fi) where pi is the caller’s usage
price (notice that we only consider the case of non network-based discrimination), ri is
the receiver’s usage price and Fi is the fixed part.
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Consumers. Consumers are differentiated along the Hotelling line. This line represents
the preferences of the consumers over one characteristic of the networks. For instance,
consumers may prefer the well know phone operator instead of a new one.
A consumer located at x and selecting network i incurs a transportation cost equal to
t|x− xi|.
The utility of placing a call is u(q), where q denotes the length of the call. As in Jeon
et al. (2004), we assume that the marginal utility that a receiver derives from receiving a
call is subject to a noise ε which introduces uncertainty about the willingness to pay for
receiving a call independently on the price she is paying.7 For instance, it could be the
case that the receiver is unwilling to talk on the phone when she is driving or working
and by considering the noise we have a more realistic model. Hence the receiver’s utility
is u˜(q) + εq and we assume that ε follows the distribution function F with support [
¯
ε, ε¯],
zero mean and density f . For simplicity we consider u˜(q) = βu(q), with β > 0. The lentgh
of calls is determined by the first one who interrupts the conversation. The caller equates
her marginal utility to the usage price pi and she would hang up when her marginal utility
is pi.
The receiver equates her marginal utility u˜′ + ε to the receiving price ri. Therefore the
receiver will solve βu′ + ε = rj for u
′ and therefore he would hang up when u′ is
rj−ε
β
.
Hence, the volume of calls is q(max{pi, (rj − ε)/β}).
The volume of calls is determined by the pair (pi, rj) and a realized value ε of the
random variable:
D(pi, rj) =
[
1− F (rj − βpi)
]
q(pi) +
∫ rj−βpi
¯
ε
q
(rj − ε
β
)
f(ε)dε. (1)
This means that with probability [1 − F (rj − βpi)] the caller hangs up first and the call
lasts q(pi) minutes. With probability F (rj − βpi) the receiver hangs up first and the call
lasts q(
rj−ε
β
) minutes. Therefore network i does not know a priori who will be the first
one to hang up and consequently, who will determine the length of the call.
Consider a consumer in network i. Her utility for calling a consumer in network j is:
U(pi, rj) =
[
1− F (rj − βpi)
]
u(q(pi)) +
∫ rj−βpi
¯
ε
u
(
q
(rj − ε
β
))
f(ε)dε. (2)
Her utility from receiving calls from a consumer that joined network j is:
U˜(pi, rj) =
∫ ε¯
rj−βpi
[
u˜(q(pi)) + q(pi)ε
]
f(ε)dε+
+
∫ rj−βpi
¯
ε
[
u˜
(
q
(rj − ε
β
))
+ q
(rj − ε
β
)
ε
]
f(ε)dε+ (3)
7This noise results in a positive probability for both the caller and the receiver of hanging up first.
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Therefore, we can write the net surplus of a consumer that joined network i as follows:
wi =v0 + niU(pi, ri) + njU(pi, rj) + niU˜(pi, ri) + njU˜(pj , ri)
− pi
[
niD(pi, ri) + njD(pi, rj)
]
− ri
[
niD(pi, ri) + njD(pj, ri)
]
− Fi (4)
where v0 is a subscriber’s utility from other mobile services.
The profits of network i are given by:
pii =ni
[
ni(pi − c)D(pi, ri) + nj [pi − c− (a− c0)]D(pi, rj) + nj(a− c0)D(pj , ri)
+ ri
(
niD(pi, ri) + njD(pj , ri)
)
+ Fi − f
]
(5)
where ni(pi − c)D(pi, ri) are the profits per user for making on-net calls, nj[pi − c− (a−
c0)]D(pi, rj) are the profits per user for making off-net calls, nj(a − c0)D(pj , ri) are the
profits for terminating off-net calls, ri[niD(pi, ri)+njD(pj , ri)] are the profits for receiving
calls, Fi is the fixed part of the multi part tariff and f is the cost per costumer.
Notice that the expression of the profits takes different forms when the caller or the
receiver determines the length of the call. On the one hand, when βpi < rj the receiver
will hang up first and then the length of the call depends only on the price r. On the other
hand, when βpi > rj the caller will hang up first and the length of the call depends only
on the price p. But the network does not know who will be the first one to hang up. To
model that, Jeon et al. (2004) introduce a noise element in the volume of calls. Therefore,
we can maximize the expression of the profits that depends on the noise. In this case the
profits are differentiable for all positive prices (pi, ri).
3 The equilibrium
In order to analyze market penetration we consider elastic subscriber participation. Ex-
plicitly, we model consumer demand as the Hotelling model with hinterlands.8 If the two
networks offer utilities w1 and w2, then network i attracts:
ni =
1
2
+
wi − wj
2t
+ λwi (6)
where λ ≥ 0 represents the magnitude of market expansion possibilities. This is one of
the novelties we introduce in our model with respect to Jeon et al. (2004) because it
allows us to analyze how different values of the access price affect the equilibrium market
penetration and the effects of the latter on welfare. In order to have non explosive market
8For more details see Armstrong & Wright (2009).
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share λ must be small enough.9 We impose:
λ < min
{
1
2(U rpp + U˜ rpp − cDrpp)
,
1
2(U cpp + U˜ cpp − pcppDcpp)
}
. (7)
The equilibrium is given by the vector of prices (pi, ri, Fi) that maximize operator i’s
profits as defined by equation (5). The only restrictions we impose are the non-negativity
of the prices. When the operator is charging strictly positive prices to its users we have a
RPP regime. Otherwise, if the receiving price is zero we have a CPP regime.10 Under the
assumption of a balanced calling pattern11, we characterize the equilibrium prices given
the access charge.
3.1 The case a < c0: the Receiving Party Pays regime
Network operators are free to charge customers for making and receiving a call. Therefore,
network i sets a caller’s usage price pi and a receiver’s usage price ri that maximize
consumers surplus that will be extracted through the fixed part Fi. Using the usual
maximization procedure, the equilibrium retail prices are:
Proposition 3.1 (Equilibrium retail prices). The symmetric equilibrium retail prices
(p, r, F ) are:
prpp = c+ (a− c0)
rrpp = c0 − a
F rpp = f +
tφ
γ(a) + [3 + γ(a)]λt
where γ(a) ≡ 1− 2λ[U rpp(a) + U˜ rpp(a)− cDrpp(a)] and φ ≡ 1 + 2λv0 − 2λf .
Proof. See appendix.
Notice that, as in the case of inelastic demand described by Jeon et al. (2004), the
usage prices are equal to the perceived marginal cost. Moreover, the fixed part is higher
9From equations (15) and (20) the derivatives of the market size with respect to the fixed part are
∂Nrpp
∂F rppi
= −
λ
γ
and
∂Ncpp
∂F cppi
= −
λ
δ
.
We must have γ > 0 and δ > 0.
10Other cases where prices other than the receiving one are zero can not be an equilibrium.
11This assumption says that the percentage of calls originated and terminated on a given network reflects
the market share of this network.
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than the fixed cost per user as long as φ > 0. Finally, the sum of the usage price is
constant and equal to the marginal cost c. The access charge determines the distribution
of cost between caller and receiver. Furthermore, notice that γ(a) is an opposite measure
of the surplus of joining a call in a RPP regime (U rpp+ U˜ rpp− cDrpp), without taking into
account the fixed fee: the bigger is γ(a), the lower is this surplus.
It is easy to compute the total size of the market and the profits in the symmetric
equilibrium:
N rpp =
[γ + (1 + γ)λt]
γ[γ + (3 + γ)λt]
φ (8)
and
pirppi =
N
2
[
F − f
]
=
γ + (1 + γ)λt
2γ[γ + (3 + γ)λt]2
tφ2. (9)
Notice that, in order to have positive equilibrium quantities, we have to impose:
φ > 0 ⇐⇒ λ > −
1
2(v0 − f)
if v0 > f,
that is always verified.12
Vanishing noise. As the noise ε tends to zero, it can be shown that the caller and the
receiver demand the same length of communication when:
a = c0 −
βc
1 + β
≡ aI .
If a > aI then the caller is determining the length of the call with probability converging
to one (caller sovereignty). Given that the equilibrium calling price is increasing in a, by
reducing the access price the length of the call increases. Otherwise, if a < aI , the receiver
is determining the length of the call (receiver sovereignty). Since the equilibrium receiving
price is decreasing in a, by increasing the access price the length of the call increases.
Hence, at a = aI , the call is the longest possible.
Since the access price a is nonnegative, an equilibrium where both caller and receiver
can determine the length of a call exists only if
β 6
c0
c− c0
< 1,
otherwise in equilibrium we can have only caller sovereignty and the longest call happens
at a = 0.
12If v0 < f , we would have an upper bound for λ:
λ <
1
2(f − v0)
.
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3.1.1 Comparative statics
The regulator of a RPP country sets the access price below the termination cost of a call.
The choice of a should take into consideration the following results.
Remember that we define γ(a) as an opposite measure of the surplus that users derive
when they join a call.
Lemma 3.1 (Call surplus). γ(a) is an decreasing function of a when a < aI and an
increasing function when a > aI .
Proof. See appendix.
This result implies that the surplus the users derive by making and receiving a call is
maximized in a = aI .
Regulatory effects on the fixed fee. The fixed fee depends on the access price only
through the impact of the latter on the net surplus the consumers derive by joining a call.
Hence in RPP regimes we do not have a “waterbed effect”: operators do not gain profits
by terminating calls and therefore they can not use them to reduce the fixed fee below the
fixed cost in order to expand the market. The effect of a variation of the access price on
the equilibrium fixed fee is:
∂F
∂a
=
∂F
∂γ
∂γ
∂a
.
Proposition 3.2 (Fixed fee). A variation of the access price affects the fixed fee through
its effect on the “call surplus” (∂F/∂γ). When the access price is set below the level that
makes caller and receiver to hang up at the same time, the fixed fee is increasing in a.
When it is set above such level, the fixed fee is decreasing in a.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition establishes a direct relationship between the surplus of the consumers
and the fixed fee. The access price determines the length of a call (and, consequently, the
utilities users derive) affecting the net surplus the consumers obtain when they join a
call (“call surplus effect”): the higher is this surplus, the higher is the fixed fee operators
choose in order to extract it.
Regulatory effects on the market size. The size of the market is affected by the
choice of the access price through its effect on the call surplus:
∂N rpp
∂a
=
∂N rpp
∂γ
∂γ
∂a
.
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Proposition 3.3 (Market penetration). The size of the market is maximized when the
access price is set at the value that makes caller and receiver eager to hang up at the same
time.
Proof. See appendix.
This result indicates that, when it wants to set an access price below the termination
cost, the regulator obtains the largest market by chosing a = aI . Notice that at a = aI
operators are charging the highest fixed fee but the market size is still the largest: the
higher surplus of a call more than compensates the consumers for the increased fixed fee.
Regulatory effects on the industry profits. The industry profits depend on the
access price through its effects on the market size and the fixed fee:
∂pi
∂a
=
(
∂pi
∂N
∂N
∂γ
+
∂pi
∂F
∂F
∂γ
)
∂γ
∂a
.
Proposition 3.4 (Profits). Networks’ profits are maximized when the access price is set
at the value that makes caller and receiver eager to hang up at the same time.
Proof. See appendix.
Profits are an increasing function of the market size and of the fixed fee. According to
the previous propositions these variables are maximized at a = aI . Therefore operators
gain the maximum profits when the regulator chooses an access price is aI .
3.2 The case a ≥ c0: the Calling Party Pays regime
We consider now the corner solution in which the networks do not charge consumers for
incoming calls, therefore r will be equal to 0. As we saw in the previous section, the price
for receiving a call decreases in the access price. When the access charge is equal to the
cost of terminating a call (a = c0), the price for receiving a call is equal to zero. For higher
values of a, the equilibrium prices are the corner solution of our maximization problem.
Proposition 3.5 (Equilibrium retail prices). When the access price is above termination
cost, the equilibrium retail prices are:
pcpp =c+
a− c0
2
rcpp =0
F cpp =f +
δt − a−c02 D[δ + (2 + δ)λt]
δ[δ + (3 + δ)λt] − λ(a− c0)D[δ + (2 + δ)λt]
φ
where δ(a) ≡ 1− 2λ[U cpp(a) + U˜ cpp(a)− pcpp(a)Dcpp(a)].
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Proof. See appendix.
These equilibrium prices hold when noise vanishes and caller and receiver want to
hang up at the same time. In this case the marginal utility of making and receiving a
call are equal to the calling and receiving prices respectively. Since the noise does not
depend on the level of the prices, there is always a strictly positive probability that one
of the two hang up first.13 Moreover notice that, similarly to γ(a) in RPP, δ(a) is also an
opposite measure of the surplus of joining a call in CPP (U cpp+ U˜ cpp− pcppDcpp) without
considering the fixed fee.
The total size of the market is:
N cpp =
δ + (1 + δ)λt
δ[δ + (3 + δ)λt]− λ(a− c0)D[δ + (2 + δ)λt]
φ.
The profits in equilibrium are:
picpp =
N
2
[N(p − c)D + F − f ]
=
[δ + (1 + δ)λt][δ − a−c02 Dλ]
2
[
δ[δ + (3 + δ)λt]− λ(a− c0)D[δ + (2 + δ)λt]
]2 tφ2.
In order to have a positive market size the access price has to satisfy:
a ≤ c0 +
[δ + (3 + δ)λt]δ
[δ + (2 + δ)λt]λD
. (10)
Notice that this condition also implies positive profits in equilibrium.
3.2.1 Comparative statics
The regulator in CPP country is setting the access price above the termination cost. It
should consider the following results.
Lemma 3.2 (Call surplus). δ(a) is an increasing function of a.
Proof. See appendix.
This result implies that the surplus the users derive by making and receiving a call
decreases when the regulator increases the access price.
13In the appendix we consider also the case when the caller determines unilaterally the length of the
call. In that case we have a discontinuity in the calling price.
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Regulatory effects on the fixed fee. The equilibrium fixed fee depends on the access
price through two different terms: δ(a), which reflects the surplus a consumer receives by
joining a call, and T (a) ≡ (a − c0)D
cpp, which are the profits an operator gains when it
terminates a call. The total effect of a variation of the access price on the equilibrim fixed
fee is given by:
∂F cpp
∂a
=
∂F cpp
∂T
∂T
∂a
+
∂F cpp
∂δ
∂δ
∂a
.
Proposition 3.6 (Regulatory effects on the CPP fixed fee). A variation of the access
price affects the fixed fee through the sum of two effects: the “waterbed effect” (∂F/∂T )
and the “call surplus effect” (∂F/∂δ). Both effects are negative and their magnitude is
increasing and, therefore, in CPP the fixed fee is decreasing in the access price.
Proof. See appendix.
Here we have two effects. As in the RPP case, also in the CPP case we have a “call
surplus effect”. The greater is the surplus generated, the greater is the fixed fee that can
be extracted from the consumers. When the access price diminishes this surplus increases
and consequently the fixed fee increases.
Moreover, in the CPP case we have also a “waterbed effect”: the operators are gaining
positive profits by terminating calls. These profits are used to reduce the fixed fee. The
total effect of the access price on the fixed part is the therefore the sum of the effects.
3.3 Comments
access price a
0 c0c0 −
βc
1+β
RPP CPP
receiver
sovereignty
caller
sovereignty
Figure 1: Access price
In our model the telecom industry chooses the retail pricing regime according to the
level of the access price. In Fig. 1 we summarize some results. When the access price
is below the termination cost c0 networks want to charge customers for receiving a call.
The equilibrium prices are equal to the perceived marginal cost. Moreover, as the noise
13
vanishes, caller and receiver decide to hang up at the same time only when the access price
is c0 −
β
1+β c. For lower values, , the price for receiving is higher than the price for calling
and therefore the receiver will hang up first (receiver sovereignty). For higher values, the
caller will hang up first (caller sovereignty). Moreover, for values of the access price higher
than c0, networks charge only the caller: the termination cost is fully paid by the calling
network and therefore the receiving operator does not need to recover it from the receiver.
Finally, we have seen that in RPP the fixed fee is always above the per user fixed cost
f and that there is only a consumer surplus effect: the fixed fee is used to extract the
surplus. Conversely, in CPP there is also a waterbed effect: the profits to terminate the
call are used to subsidize the fixed cost and the fixed fee is decreasing in the access price.
4 Comparison
In this section we compare the two regimes. Table 2 resumes the equilibrium values we
found above.
Receiving Party Pays (a < c0) Calling Party Pays (a > c0)
p c+ (a− c0) c+
a−c0
2
r c0 − a 0
Fixed part F f + t
γ+(3+γ)λtφ f +
δt−
a−c0
2
D[δ+(2+δ)λt]
δ[δ+(3+δ)λt]−λ(a−c0)D[δ+(2+δ)λt]
φ
Market size N γ+(1+γ)λt
γ[γ+(3+γ)λt]φ
δ+(1+δ)λt
δ[δ+(3+δ)λt]−λ(a−c0)D[δ+(2+δ)λt]
φ
Profits pi γ+(1+γ)λt
2γ[γ+(3+γ)λt]2
tφ2
[δ+(1+δ)λt][δ−
a−c0
2
Dλ]
2
[
δ[δ+(3+δ)λt]−λ(a−c0)D[δ+(2+δ)λt]
]2 tφ2
where φ ≡ 1 + 2λv0 − 2λf .
Table 2: Comparison
Usage price. The calling price in CPP is always higher than the calling price in RPP.
Fig. 2 illustrates the calling price (the thin line) and the receiver price (the thick line).
We represent the optimal prices p and r according to the possible levels of the access price
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aI c0
p
r  Β
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
a
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Usage prices
(a) β = 0.25
aI c0
p
r  Β
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
a
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Usage prices
(b) β = 0.5
aI c0
p
r  Β
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
a
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Usage prices
(c) β = 0.75
c0
r  Β
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Figure 2: Usage prices p and r. Parameter values: c0 = 0.01, c = 0.02.
a. We chose the cost parameters following Hoernig & Harbord (2010). The dashed line
c0 marks the threshold between the RPP regime (to the left) and the CPP regime (to
the right). The dotted line aI divides the regions where, as the noise vanishes, we have
receiver sovereignty (to the left) and caller sovereignty (to the right).
Remember that the cost of a call is c. Part of this cost is borne by caller’s network
and part by the receiver’s network. In RPP regime (a < c0) it is efficient to set the total
price of a call equal to the marginal cost c. The access price a determines how caller and
receiver share the cost of the call. In this case the slope of the calling price with respect
to the access charge is one.
In CPP the slope of the calling price is smaller. If we allow networks to charge negative
prices, therefore, when the access charge is above cost, they would subsidize receiver and
they would charge callers the same RPP price. Since in our model we impose strictly
positive prices, networks can not subsidize receivers, therefore they use the termination
profits (a−c02 ) to reduce calling price. Hence the calling price in CPP will be p
cpp = c+ a−c02 .
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Length of a call. As usual, the demand function in terms of length of a call, q(·), is
a decreasing function of the retail prices (q′ < 0). Moreover we saw that, as the noise
vanishes, the length of the call is determined by the caller with probability converging to
one when a > aI .
Proposition 4.1 (Length of a call.). Calls last more under RPP regime when calls ex-
ternality is high enough, i.e.:
β ≥
c0
c
.
If β < c0/c calls last more under RPP only if the access price is high enough, i.e.:
c0 − βc < a < c0.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition provides support to some empirical evidences: under RPP regimes
the length of calls is significantly longer than under CPP. According with proposition 4.1
calls are longer under RPP if the externality the receivers perceived is high enough.
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Figure 3: Length of a call q. Parameter values: c0 = 0.01, c = 0.02, t = 1500 and η = 2.
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We represented the length of a call for different values of β in Fig. 3. From now on, we
use a constant elasticity demand function q(p) = p−η (as in Hoernig (2007)) where η > 1
and u(q) = η
η−1q
η−1
η . The dotted line is still representing the threshold between receiver
sovereignty and caller sovereignty while the dashed line separates RPP regime from CPP
regime.
Notice that the longest length is attained for aI , when caller and receiver want to hang
up at the same time. The reason is that in RPP the price of a call is shared between caller
and receiver, taking into account the positive externality on the receiver and, therefore,
the calls tend to be longer. But this is true only when caller and receiver are eager to
hang up more or less at the same time. Otherwise who is bearing the higher price prefers
to end the call earlier and, given that in RPP the variation of the retail prices is steeper,
the length of the call drops quicker than in CPP.
For low values of call externality β, BaK produces shorter calls than values of access
charge just above termination cost.
For high values of β (Fig. 3c and 3d) access prices close (or equal) to zero imply
longer calls in RPP than CPP. Since for higher values of the externality the receiver is
eager to pay for receiving a call, the value of a that makes caller and receiver to hang up
at the same time shifts towards zero where the associated retail prices are higher for the
receiver. This allows the regulator to set zero access price and keeping calls longer than
CPP regimes. This confirms the expectation of Ofcom (2009, pag. 37):
[. . . ] international comparisons provide evidence that this relationship be-
tween termination rates, and take-up and usage, exists. A simple analysis of
cross-country data [. . . ] suggests that countries that have, broadly speaking,
systems that adopt reciprocity or “bill and keep”-like arrangements – US, Hong
Kong and Singapore (and to a lesser degree Canada) have higher usage than
countries with “Calling Party’s Network Pays” regimes.
Fixed part. Fig. 4 illustrates the comparison between the fixed part in the two price
regimes. First, notice that the value of λ is chosen according to equation (7). It is
worthwhile to notice that at a = aI we have the highest fixed part in RPP. The reason is
straightforward: aI maximizes consumer surplus of joining a call and therefore networks
can extract a higher surplus through the fixed part. Indeed this is also the reason why in
these graphs higher fixed tariffs are associated to longer calls.
For low values of calls externality, the relationship between equilibrium values in RPP
and in CPP is not univocally determined.
For high values of β, fixed part in RPP is higher than fixed part in CPP. In particular,
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Figure 4: Fixed part F . Parameter values: c0 = 0.01, c = 0.02, t = 1500, λ = 0.002,
η = 2, f = 0 and v0 = 750.
BaK determines higher fixed fee than any other value of the access charge. The reason is
that, when access charge is below cost, calls last more, therefore the consumers’ surplus
that networks can extract is higher. This coincides with many empirical observations. For
instance, Ofcom (2009, pag. 37) expects:
High termination rates tend to lead to a retail price structure with relatively
high off-net call charges (since operators ‘cover’ their wholesale cost of each
minute of a call with a corresponding retail charge) and lower subscription
charges (since subscribers generate incoming calls that provide call termination
revenue). [. . . ] Equally, if termination rates are low, consumers will tend to
face higher subscription fees but lower or no charges to make (or receive) calls.
Market penetration. Fig. 5 illustrates that there is not a clear relationship between
market penetration in the two regimes. For low values of receiver externality, there are
values of access charge such that penetration is higher in CPP regimes. Conversely, for
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high receiver externality, RPP regimes present a high number of subscribers. This indeter-
minacy is also present in empirical evidence: on the one hand Littlechild (2006) shows how
CPP are denoted by higher market penetration, on the other hand Analysis Mason (2008)
states that actual data misrepresent true values of penetration by overestimating penetra-
tion in CPP countries. Moreover, high penetration is explained through the higher surplus
the consumers receive. Once again in RPP we have the highest penetration at a = aI .
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Figure 5: Market penetration N . Parameter values: c0 = 0.01, c = 0.02, t = 1500,
λ = 0.002, η = 2, f = 0 and v0 = 750.
Graphics show, once again, that RPP regimes are more sensible to variations of the
perceived externality: penetration is increasing in β.
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4.1 Welfare analysis
We compare the welfare in the two regimes in Fig. 6. Total welfare is given by a weighted
sum of consumers surplus and industry profits.14 As it is clear, the highest welfare in
RPP is attained at a = aI . At this value of the access price, consumer surplus of a call is
maximized and the network can obtain the highest profits by extracting it. In CPP the
highest welfare is associated to values of the access price close to the termination cost.
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Figure 6: Total welfare W . Parameter values: c0 = 0.01, c = 0.02, t = 1500, λ = 0.002,
η = 2, f = 0 and v0 = 750.
Notice that as the receiver externality increases, the welfare is getting higher in RPP
14The consumer surplus is given by the net surplus consumers perceive in equilibrium according with
equation (4) minus the total amount of the transportation costs:
CSrpp =
“
v0 +N
rpp(Urpp + U˜rpp − cDrpp)− F rpp
”
Nrpp −
"„
Nrpp − 1
2
«2
+
1
4
#
t;
CScpp =
“
v0 +N
cpp(Ucpp + U˜cpp − pcppDcpp)− F cpp
”
Ncpp −
"„
Ncpp − 1
2
«2
+
1
4
#
t.
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regimes. This fact remarks once again the importance for the regulator of having a very
precise knowledge of the values of β when choosing the access price: very low values of a
(accompanied by a RPP regime) are socially optimal only if the receiving externality is
high. The European Commission (2008) ends up to the same conclusion:
RPP might not be efficient if the calling party values the call highly but the
called party does not and, as a result, an efficient call might not be completed.
The reverse issue may arise in the CPP system, where an efficient call may not
be initiated even if the called party values it highly but the calling party does
not.
Indeed, if a regulator considers that in its country the externality is very low BaK is not
the welfare maximizing policy.
Finally, assigning different weights to consumers surplus and industry profits, results
do not change qualitatively.
5 Conclusions
Regulatory authorities are concerned about reducing mobile termination rates but there
is a lack of theoretical analysis that could give them hints about the consequences of such
a policy.
The European Commission (2008, 2009) proposed a drastic reduction of the mobile
termination rates during the next years. This, according to empirical evidence and compa-
nies’ previsions, would imply to charge consumers for receiving calls in order to cover the
termination cost of a call: the European Commission (2008, pag. 26) noticed that “RPP
may evolve after a reduction of the regulated termination charge or as a response to a Bill
and Keep system”. Ofcom (2005) warned that RPP regimes could find the opposition of
consumers who do not want to be charged for incoming calls.
In our paper we provide a theoretical framework that allows to compare the two tariff
regimes. We confirm the relationship between interconnection arrangements and retail
price structure. It turns out that it does not exist one tariff regime superior to the other
other in terms of retail prices, usage, market penetration and overall welfare for all values
of the access price.
Using realistic values of the industry parameters, we find out that the level of the call
externality is crucial. When it takes high values, market penetration and total welfare are
higher in a RPP regime with access charges close to zero. This suggests that a BaK policy
(which results in the adoption of a RPP regime) should be implemented only once the
presence of a high call externality is proven. Otherwise access pricing at the termination
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cost would be a better policy.
Up to our knowledge, there are no estimates of the call externalities. On the one hand, the
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC (2010b)) pointed
out that it seems reasonable to assume that the utility of the receiver is lower than that
of the caller but that the difference is not very significant. On the other hand, in BEREC
(2010a) several phone companies claim that the call externalities are very low or even
equal to zero.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1 To find the usage prices we maximize profits with respect
to pi and ri keeping market share ni constant:
max
pi,ri
pii
s.t. pi, ri ≥ 0
We look for the interior solutions where pi, ri > 0. For a given ni, the first order derivative
of pii with respect to pi when r = ri = rj is:
q′[1− F (r − βpi)]{(ni + nj)(u
′ − c)− nj(a− c0) + ni(u˜
′ + E[ε|ε > r − βpi])
− ni
1
1 + 2tλ
(u˜′ + E[ε|ε > r − βpi]− r)} = 0. (11)
Similarly, for a given ni, the first order derivative with respect to ri when p = pi = pj is:
ni(u
′ − c) + nj(a− c0) + (ni + nj)u˜
′ + ni
1
1 + 2tλ
(u′ − p) +
E[εq′|ε 6 ri − βp]
E[q′|ε 6 ri − βp]
= 0. (12)
As the noise vanishes, when the caller and the receiver want to hang up at the same
time we have that u′ = p and u˜′ = r. In a symmetric equilibrium the first order conditions
turn out to be:
p = (c− r) +
1
2
(c+ a− c0 − c+ r)
r = (c0 − a) +
1
2
(c− p− c0 + a).
Notice that both conditions hold for p = c+ a− c0 and r = c0 − a. To find the fixed part
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of the two-part tariff, we derive profits with respect to Fi:
∂pii
∂Fi
=
∂ni
∂Fi
[
ni(pi − c)D(pi, ri) + nj(pi − c− (a− c0))D(pi, rj) + nj(a− c0)D(pj , ri)
+ ri
(
niD(pi, ri) + njD(pj, ri)
)
+ Fi − f
]
+ ni
[∂ni
∂Fi
(pi − c)D(pi, ri) +
∂nj
∂Fi
(pi − c− (a− c0))D(pi, rj) +
∂nj
∂Fi
(a− c0)D(pj , ri)
+ ri
(∂ni
∂Fi
D(pi, ri) +
∂nj
∂Fi
D(pj , ri)
)
+ 1
]
Using equilibrium prices:
∂pii
∂Fi
=
∂ni
∂Fi
[
ni(pi − c)D(pi, ri) + nj(a− c0)D(pj, ri)
+ ri
(
niD(pi, ri) + njD(pj , ri)
)
+ Fi − f
]
+ ni
[∂ni
∂Fi
(pi − c)D(pi, ri) +
∂nj
∂Fi
(a− c0)D(pj , ri)
+ ri
(∂ni
∂Fi
D(pi, ri) +
∂nj
∂Fi
D(pj, ri)
)
+ 1
]
=
∂ni
∂Fi
[
Fi − f
]
+ ni = 0
Therefore the fixed part is:
Fi = f −
ni
∂ni
∂Fi
(13)
Combining (4) with (6) we find the total size of the market N and the number of consumers
ni: We obtain:
N =
1− λ(Fi + Fj − 2v0)
1− 2λ(U + U˜ − cD)
and
ni =
N
2
+
(Fj − Fi)(1 + λt)
2t
(14)
Let us write the market size as follows:
N =
1− λ(Fi + Fj − 2v0)
γ
(15)
where γ(a) ≡ 1− 2λ(U rpp+ U˜ rpp− cDrpp). The derivative of the market share of network
i with respect to Fi is:
∂ni
∂Fi
=
1
2
[∂N
∂Fi
−
1 + λt
t
]
=−
1
2
λt+ γ(1 + λt)
γt
(< 0) (16)
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Substituting (14) and (15) into (13) and looking for the symmetric equilibrium, we have:
Fi =f +
N
2
2γt
λt+ γ(1 + λt)
.
Solving for F we obtain:
F =f +
tφ
γ + (3 + γ)λt
.
Proof of Lemma 3.1 Remember that γ(a) ≡ 1−2λ(U rpp+U˜ rpp−cDrpp). Its derivative
is:
∂γ
∂a
= −2λ
[∂U
∂a
+
∂U˜
∂a
− c
∂D
∂a
]
.
Let us first compute the derivative of the volume of calls with respect to the access price.
∂D
∂a
=
∂D
∂p
∂p
∂a
+
∂D
∂r
∂r
∂a
where15
∂D
∂p
=
∂F (r − βp)
∂p
βq(p) + [1− F (r − βp)]q′ + q(p)f(r − βp)(−β) = [1− F (r − βp)]q′
∂D
∂r
=− f(r − βp)q(p) + q(p)f(r − βp) +
1
β
∫ r−βp
¯
ε
q′f(ε)dε
=
1
β
E
[
q′
∣∣∣ε ≤ r − βp]F (r − βp).
Hence, we have
∂D
∂a
=
[
1− F (r − βp)
]
q′ −
1
β
E
[
q′
∣∣∣ε ≤ r − βp]F (r − βp).
The derivative of the utility derived by making calls with respect to the access price is:
∂U
∂a
=
∂U
∂p
∂p
∂a
+
∂U
∂r
∂r
∂a
where
∂U
∂p
=
∂F (r − βp)
∂p
βu(q) + [1− F (r − βp)]u′(q)q′ + u(q)f(r − βp)(−β)
=[1− F (r − βp)]u′(q)q′
∂U
∂r
=−
F (r − βp)
∂r
u(q) + u(q)f(r − βp) +
1
β
∫ r−βp
¯
ε
u′(q)q′f(ε)dε
=
1
β
E
[
u′q′
∣∣∣ε ≤ r − βp]F (r − βp).
15Hereinafter q′ < 0 denotes the derivative of the lenght of a call with respect to the usage price.
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Hence, we have
∂U
∂a
=
[
1− F (r − βp)
]
u′q′ −
1
β
E
[
u′q′
∣∣∣ε ≤ r − βp]F (r − βp).
The derivative of the utility derived by receiving calls with respect to the access price is:
∂U˜
∂a
=
∂U˜
∂p
∂p
∂a
+
∂U˜
∂r
∂r
∂a
where
∂U˜
∂p
=u˜′q′[1− F (rj − βpi)] + βu˜(q(pi))f(rj − βpi) + q
′ [1− F (rj − βpj)]E[ε|ε ≥ rj − βpi]
+βq(pi)(rj − βpi)f(rj − βpi)− βu˜ (q(pi)) f(rj − βpi)− βq(pi)(rj − βpi)f(rj − βpi)
=
(
u˜′ + E
[
ε
∣∣∣ε ≥ r − βp])[1− F (r − βp)]q′
∂U˜
∂r
=−
F (r − βp)
∂r
u˜(q) + qf(r − βp)(r − βp) + u˜(q)f(r − βp) +
1
β
∫ r−βp
¯
ε
u˜′(q)q′f(ε)dε
+ (r − βp)q(p)f(r − βp) +
1
β
∫ r−βp
¯
ε
q′εf(ε)dε
=
1
β
E
[
q′(u˜′ + ε)
∣∣∣ε ≤ r − βp]F (r − βp).
Hence, we have
∂U˜
∂a
=
(
u˜+ E
[
ε
∣∣∣ε ≥ r − βp])[1− F (r − βp)]q′ − 1
β
E
[
q′(u˜′ + ε)
∣∣∣ε ≤ r − βp]F (r − βp).
Hence, the derivative of γ(a) is:
∂γ(a)
∂a
= 2λ
{ 1
β
F (r − βp)E[(u′(q) + u˜′(q) + ε− c)q′|ε ≤ r − βp]
+
[
1− F (r − βp)
][
c− u′(q)− u˜′(q)− E[ε|ε ≥ r − βp]
]
q′
}
.
As the noise vanishes we get:
∂γ(a)
∂a
= 2λ
{ 1
β
F (r − βp)
[
u′(q) + u˜′(q)− c
]
q′ −
[
1− F (r − βp)
][
u′(q)− u˜′(q)− c
]
q′
}
.
Notice that when a > aI (a < aI) the caller (the receiver) wants to hang up first and
therefore we have u˜′(q) > r (u′(q) > p). This implies that u′(q) + u˜′(q)− c > 0. Moreover
remember that F (r − βp) denotes the probability that the receiver hang up first: as the
noise tends to zero this probability is equal to 1 in receiver sovereignty and equal to 0 in
consumer sovereignty. Finally we have:
∂γ
∂a
=


2λ
β
[
u′(q) + u˜′(q)− c
]
q′ < 0 if a < aI ;
−2λ
[
u′(q) + u˜′(q)− c
]
q′ > 0 if a > aI .
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Proof of Proposition 3.2 We have:
∂F
∂γ
= −
(1 + λt)φt
[γ + (3 + γ)λt]2
< 0.
In Proposition 3.1 we proved the sign of ∂γ/∂a. Hence we have:
∂F
∂a
> 0 if a < aI and
∂F
∂a
< 0 if a > aI .
Proof of Proposition 3.3 Let us take the derivative with respect to the access price
of the market size in (8):
∂N
∂a
= −
φ
[
[γ(1 + λt) + λt]2 + 2λ2t2
]
γ2[γ + (3 + γ)λt]2
∂γ
∂a
.
Notice that the fraction is strictly positive. Therefore the sign of the derivative is the
opposite of the sign of ∂γ/∂a as given in Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.4 In propositions 3.2 and 3.3 we found that:
∂F
∂γ
< 0 and
∂N
∂γ
< 0.
Moreover notice that, according to equation (9), we have:
∂pi
∂N
=
F − f
2
> 0 and
∂pi
∂F
=
N
2
> 0.
Thefore the sign of the derivative of the profits with respect to the access price is the
opposite of the sign of ∂γ/∂a given in Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
max
pi,ri
pii
s.t. pi, ri ≥ 0
We look for the corner solution of this problem when ri = 0. Given market share constant,
the first order derivative of the profits in (5) with respect to pi is:
We derive the indifference condition ni = 1/2 +
1
2t(wi − wj) + λwi with respect to pi and
we obtain:
∂ni
∂pi
=
1
2t
[∂wi
∂pi
−
∂wj
∂pi
]
+ λ
∂wi
∂pi
= (
1
2t
+ λ)
∂wi
∂pi
−
1
2t
∂wj
∂pi
(17)
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where the derivative of the surplus with respect to pi are:
∂wi
∂pi
=ni
∂Uii
∂pi
+ nj
∂Uij
∂pi
+ ni
∂U˜ii
∂pi
+ nj
∂Uji
∂pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−niDii − njDij
− pi
[
ni
∂Dii
∂pi
+ nj
∂Uij
∂pi
]
− ri
[
ni
∂Dii
∂pi
+ nj
∂Uji
∂pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
]
−
∂Fi
∂pi
∂wj
∂pi
=ni
∂U˜ij
∂pi
− rjni
∂Dij
∂pi
.
From (17) we have:
∂Fi
∂pi
=−
1
1 + 2λt
ni
[∂U˜ij
∂pi
− rj
∂Dij
∂pi
]
+ ni
∂Uii
∂pi
+ nj
∂Uij
∂pi
+ ni
∂U˜ii
∂pi
− niDii − njDij
− pi
[
ni
∂Dii
∂pi
+ nj
∂Uij
∂pi
]
− ri
[
ni
∂Dii
∂pi
]
(18)
The derivative of the profits with respect to pi is:
∂pii
∂pi
= ni
[
Dii + ni(pi − c)
∂Dii
∂pi
+ njDij + nj[pi − c− (a− c0)]
∂Dij
∂pi
+ niri
∂Dii
∂pi
+
∂Fi
∂pi
]
(19)
We substitute (18) into (19). Setting (19) equal to zero we obtain:
− nic
∂Dii
∂pi
− nj(c+ a− c0)
∂Dij
∂pi
+ ni
∂Uii
∂pi
+ nj
∂Uij
∂pi
+
+ ni
∂U˜ii
∂pi
− ni
1
1 + 2λt
[∂U˜ij
∂pi
− ri
∂Dij
∂pi
]
= 0
We have:
− cni(1− F [ri − βpi])q
′(pi)− nj [c+ (a− c0)](1− F [rj − βpi])q
′(pi)+
+ ni(1− F [ri − βpi])u
′(q)q′(pi) + nj(1− F [rj − βpi])u
′(q)q′(pi)+
+ ni[u˜
′(q) + E(ε|ε ≥ ri − βpi)](1 − F [ri − βpi])q
′(pi)− ni
1
1 + 2λt
[
[u˜′(q)+
+E(ε|ε ≥ ri − βpin)](1− F [ri − βpi])q
′(pi)− ri(1− F [rj − βpi])q
′(pi)
]
= 0
We look for the symmetric equilibrium where ri = rj = r. We have:
(u′ − c)(ni + nj)− nj(a− c0) +
[
1−
1
1 + 2λt
]
ni
[
u˜′ + E(ε|ε ≥ ri − βpi)
]
+
nir
1 + 2λt
= 0
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We look for a symmetric equilibrium when the caller and the receiver want to hang up at
the same time (i.e. u′ = p and u˜′ = r as the noise vanishes).16 Solving for p we finally
have:
p = c+
a− c0
2
−
λt
1 + 2λt
[
r + E(ε|ε ≥ r − βp)
]
+
1
1 + 2λt
r
2
Assuming that ε ≥ −βp holds for every value of ε, we have that E(ε|ε ≥ −βp) = 0, so,
when r = 0, the equilibrium calling price becomes:
p = c+
a− c0
2
Let us now derive the fixed part Fi and the size of the market. The surplus of the
consumer joining network i, given the equilibrium retail prices, is:
wi = v0 +N(U + U˜ − pD)− Fi
therefore the quantity of consumers that join network i is:
ni =
1
2
+
wi − wj
2t
+ λwi
1
2
+
Fj − Fi
2t
+ λ[v0 +N(U + U˜ − pD)− Fi]
Adding up the market shares:
ni + nj =1 + λ[2v0 + 2N(U + U˜ − pD)− Fi − Fj ] solving for N
N =
1− λ[Fi + Fj − 2v0]
1− 2λ(U + U˜ − pD)
N =
1− λ[Fi + Fj − 2v0]
δ
(20)
where δ(a) ≡ 1− 2λ(U cpp + U˜ cpp − pDcpp).
ni =
N
2
+
(Fj − Fi)(1 + λt)
2t
16Since the random noise does not depend on the prices, the receiver may want to hang up first even
tough she does not pay for receiving a call. Otherwise, if we consider the case where the caller decides
to hang up with probability one, the marginal utility of the receiver is u˜′ = βu′ = βp. In this case the
equilibrium retail prices become:
pcpp =
“
c+
a− c0
2
”
µ
rcpp =0
F cpp =f +
δt− (ppcc − c)D[δ + (2 + δ)λt]
δ[δ + (3 + δ)λt]− 2λ(pcpp − c)D[δ + (2 + δ)λt]
φ
where δ(a) ≡ 1 − 2λ(Ucpp + U˜cpp − pcppDcpp) and µ ≡ 1+2λt
1+2λt+βλt
. Notice that in this case there a
discontinuity in the calling price at a = c0.
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To find the fixed part Fi, we derive the profits with respect to Fi and we substitute the
equilibrium retail price. We obtain:
∂pii
∂Fi
=
∂ni
∂Fi
[
N(p − c)D + Fi − f
]
+ ni
[(∂ni
∂Fi
+
∂nj
∂Fi
)
(p− c)D + 1
]
= 0
∂ni
∂Fi
Fi = f −
[
N(p− c)D + ni
∂N
∂Fi
(p− c)D + ni
]
F cpp = f +
δt − (p− c)D[δ + (2 + δ)λt]
δ[δ + (3 + δ)λt] − 2λ(p − c)D[δ + (2 + δ)λt]
φ
Proof of Lemma 3.2 This proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.1. Here we get:
∂δ
∂a
= −2λ
{
[1− F (r − βp)] (u′ + u˜′ − p)q′ −
Dcpp
2
}
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.6 We analyze the four derivates separately. The sign of ∂F/∂T
is given by:
sign
(
∂F
∂T
)
= sign (−(λt+ δ + δλt)(2λt + δ + δλt)) < 0,
that is, there is a waterbed effect.
Moreover, we have:
∂T
∂a
= D + (a− c0)D
′ > 0⇐⇒ a < c0 −
D
D′
.
Notice that D′ < 0 and, therefore, for all values of the access price bigger than c0, i.e., the
values of a that determines a CPP regime, the profits for terminating a call are increasing
in a until a < c0 − D/D
′. Without restricting too much our analysis we can assume a
regulator is interested in the values of a close to c0 and that satisfy this condition.
The sign of ∂F/∂δ is:
sign
(
∂F
∂δ
)
= sign
(
−2t(1 + λt)δ2 + [2λ2t2 + (1 + λt)(4λt+ δ + δλt)δ]
)
< 0
when condition (10) holds, that is, for all the values of a that makes it profitable for an
operator to stay in the market. This implies a positive consumer surplus effect.17
In the proof of Proposition 3.2 we proved that ∂δ/∂a > 0.
17Remember that δ(a) reprensents the opposit of the surplus derived by the consumers when they join
a call.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1 The condition on β comes comparing the higher possible
receiving price18 (r = c0) with the lower possible price in CPP (p = c):
c0
β
< c ⇐⇒ β >
c0
c
.
References
Analysis Mason (2008). Case studies of mobile termination regimes in canada, hong kong,
singapore and the usa: report for ofcom. Technical report, Analysis Mason.
Armstrong, M. (1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. The Economic
Journal, 108 (448), 545–564.
Armstrong, M. (2002). The theory of access pricing and interconnection, volume 1, (pp.
295–384). North-Holland.
Armstrong, M. & Wright, J. (2009). Mobile call termination. The Economic Journal, 199,
270–307.
BEREC (2010a). Consultation report to the common statement “next generation networks
future charging mechanisms / long term termination issues”. Technical report, BEREC.
available at http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/berec/bor_10_24b.pdf.
BEREC (2010b). Next generation networks future charging mechanisms /
long term termination issues. Technical report, BEREC. available at
http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/berec/bor_10_24_ngn.pdf.
Bomsel, O., Cave, M., Blanc, G. L., & Neumann, K.-H. (2003). How mobile termina-
tion charges shape the dynamics of the telecom sector. Technical report, University of
Warwik and Wik Consult.
Cadman, R. (2007). Ngn interconnection: Charging principles and economic efficiency.
Technical report, NGN UK, London.
Cambini, C. & Valletti, T. (2008). Information exchange and competition in communica-
tios networks. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 22, 1821.
ERG (2009). Next generation networks future charging mechanisms / long term termina-
tion issues. Technical report, European Regulatory Group.
18Remember that the marginal utility of the receiver has to be equal to r/β in order to maximize her
utility.
30
European Commission (2008). Explanatory note accompanying document to the commis-
sion recomandations on the regulatory treatment of fixed and mobile termination rates
in the eu. Technical report, European Commission, Brussels.
European Commission (2009). Commission recommentation of 7 may 2009 on the regula-
tory treatment of fixed and mobile termination rates in the eu (2009/396/ec). Technical
report, European Commission, Brussels.
Gans, J. S. & King, S. P. (2001). Using ‘bill and keep’ interconnect arrangements to soften
network competition. Economics Letters, 71 (3), 413 – 420.
Hermalin, B. & Katz, M. (2009). Customer or complementor? intercarrier compensation
with two-sided benefits. Working Paper.
Hoernig, S. (2007). On-net and off-net pricing on asymmetric telecommunications net-
works. Information Economics and Policy, 19 (2), 171 – 188.
Hoernig, S. & Harbord, D. (2010). Welfare analysis of regulating mobile termination rates
in the uk (with an application to the orange/t-mobile merger). Working Paper.
Jeon, D.-S., Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (2004). On the ”receiver-pays” principle. The
RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (1), 85–110.
Laffont, J.-J., Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (1998a). Network competition: I. overview and nondis-
criminatory pricing. The RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (1), 1–37.
Laffont, J.-J., Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (1998b). Network competition: Ii. price discrimination.
The RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (1), 38–56.
Littlechild, S. (2006). Mobile termination charges: Calling party pays versus receiving
party pays. Telecommunications Policy, 30 (5-6), 242 – 277.
Lopez, A. (2008). Mobile termination rates and the receiver-pays regime. Working paper.
Ofcom (2005). Wholesale mobile voice call termination. preliminary consultation on future
regulation. Technical report, Ofcom.
Ofcom (2009). Wholesale mobile voice call termination. preliminary consultation on future
regulation. Technical report, Ofcom.
Oftel (2002). Receiving party pays compared to calling party pays. Technical report,
Oftel.
31
Samarajiva, R. & Melody, W. H. (2000). Briefing paper. In Fixed-Mobile Interconnection
Workshop. available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/fmi/workshop/.
32
